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SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------
--------------------------------
INTERSTATE EXCAVATING, INC., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 16599 
AGLA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
-----------------
RESPONDENTS BRIEF 
-----------------
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Respondent, Interstate Excavating, Inc., brought suit 
against appellant for sums due for labor and materials for construe-
tion of sewer and water systems in two subdivisions. Appellant 
Counterclaimed for back-charges. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third District Court, Judge Jay E. Banks, entered a 
default judgment against appellant at trial and dismissed appellant~s 
counterclaim. Appellant's Motion to vacate the judgment was 
denied by Judge Banks, after hearing, on June 18, 1979. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order denying its Motion 
to vacate the default judgment. 
11 
1' 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, Interstate Excavating Inc., commenced an 
action against appellant, Agla Development Company on May 16, 
1978 after appellant refused to pay for labor and materials 
for construction of the water and sewer systems in two subdivision 
(Falcon Hurst #1 and Falcon Hurst #2) located in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. (R.2-7) Prior to the action being brought, 
respondent, by agreement and in reliance thereon that payment 
would be made by appellant, released 66 lots in Falcon Hurst #1 
and 55 lots in Falcon Hurst #2, under its materialmans lien. 
(R.15-16) 
An answer and counterclaim was filed to respondent's 
complaint on behalf of appellant by its attorney, Robert J. Haws. 
(R.10-14) A reply was made to the counterclaim. (R.21-22) 
The case was set for trial on May 7, 1979, pursuant to notice 
that was served on each of the parties by the Clerk of the Court 
by mailing to the respective attorneys. (R.24) A pre-trial settle 
ment conference was held before Judge Hal G. Taylor on April 
16, 1979, pursuant to order and notice from the Clerk of the 
Court duly served by mailing on each of the parties. (R.25-28) 
A notice of withdrawal of counsel was filed with the Court on 
April 13, 1979, by Robert J. Haws, attorney for the appellant. 
(R.27) At the pre-trial settlement conference, appellant's counsE 
requested that he be allowed to withdraw and was granted per-
mission to do so by Judge Taylor. (R.28) Respondent's attorney 
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was instructed by Judge Taylor to notify the appellant that his 
counsel had withdrawn, to appoint new counsel, and of the trial 
setting of May 7, 1979. (R.28) Notice was sent to the appellant, 
at its business offices the same day of the pre-trial settlement 
conference, April 16, 1979, by respondent's attorney, as instruc-
ted. (R. 29) 
Respondent appeared at trial on May 7, 1979, prepared to 
prove its claims. Appellant failed to appear at trial, either 
by corporate officer or counsel. A judgment by default was 
granted in favor of respondent after evidence was presented 
at the request of the Court by respondent in support of its 
claims. The counterclaim of appellant was dismissed with prejudice 
on Motion of respondent. (R.30-34) A copy of the judgment 
and decree of foreclosure was served upon appellant by mailing 
to its corporate offices on May 14, 1979. (R.34) 
After receiving a copy of the judgment, appellant obtained 
counsel and filed a verified motion to vacate the judgment. 
(R.35-36) The motion of appellant was denied by Judge Banks 
at a hearing held thereon, June 18, 1979. (R.37) A copy of the 
order denying appellant's motion was mailed to Mr. DeLand, 
11 • 1 June 18, 1979 and was signed by Judge appe ant s counse on 
Banks on July 6, 1979. (R.38) Appellant appealed the order 
Vacate the J'udgment by notice of appeal denying its motion to 
filed July 19, 1979. (R. 39) 
in its brief under "Statement The statement of appellant, 
of Facts," the trl.al date was received until that "no notice of 
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L 
a copy of the default judgment was received" is not supported 
by the facts in this case. Appellant received two notices of 
the trial setting prior to the trial, the first from its 
attorney, Mr. Haws, and the second from respondents counsel. 
Both the notice of withdrawal of counsel (R.27) and the notice 
to appoint counsel (R.29) which were mailed to appellant at its 
corporate offices, gave appellant notice of the trial date. The 
receipt of the notice of withdrawal of counsel is not denied by 
appellant and the receipt of the notice to appoint counsel 
is admitted by Lafe Brown, appellant's President. 
ARGUMENT 
DENIAL OF APPELLANTS MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT 
WAS WITHIN SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 
The Motion of appellant to vacate the judgment was made 
pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
the only provisions of law justifying the setting aside of a 
default judgment. This rule provides relief from a final judgment 
for reasons of "mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable 
neglect". 
It is apparent from the uncontroverted facts, that none of 
these grounds exist in the instant case. For this reason, the 
denial of the motion to vacate the judgment was a proper exercise 
of the discretion of the trial Court. 
Since Lafe Brown, President of Agla Development, the 
appellant, was specifically informed as to his obligation to 
appoint counsel, after his counsel had withdrawn, (he having fired 
his counsel) and had received at least two notices of the trial 
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date, (notice of withdrawal of counsel and notice to appoint 
counsel) and was given ample time in which to act, there are 
no grounds whatsoever to reasonably argue that his failure to 
appoint counsel and appear at the scheduled trial was by reason 
of mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect. Lafe 
Brown, as President of Agla Development, the appellant, had ample 
notice to appoint counsel and appear at the scheduled trial 
but willingly chose to ignore the notices he received under 
the state of the circumstances. 
The sole excuse for failing to appoint new counsel and 
appearing at the scheduled trial, is the claim that the notice 
to appoint counsel was misplaced with numerous pleadings served 
upon defendant at its office by mail. If this constitutes 
neglect, it is far from "excusable neglect" since Lafe Brown, 
appellant's President, had fired Mr. Haws, was informed of the 
trial date and the requirement that he appoint new counsel at 
least three weeks prior to the scheduled trial. Having failed 
to take any action to appoint new counsel and appear at the 
trial after admittedly receiving notice in ample time to do so, 
constitutes willful conduct on the part of the appellant. Willful 
conduct cannot constitute "neglect". It follows with even greater 
force that willful conduct cannot constitute "excusable neglect"· 
The claim of Lafe Brown, President of appellant, "that the notice 
· · f ·1· of the of trial was not received until a certificate o mai ing 
d" judgment of foreclosure, under date of May 14, 1979, was serve ' 
is clearly not supported by the facts and is contradicted by 
-5-
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the verified motion of Mr. Brown. 
The situation involved in the instant case has some simil~ 
to that involved in Heath v. Mower, 597 P.2d 855 (1979). In 
that case, the attorney for the defendant, Mower, filed a notice 
of withdrawal of counsel with a certification that a copy of the 
withdrawal had been sent to the defendants last known address. 
Later, an amended notice of withdrawal of counsel was sent to 
the defendant after his attorney learned of his current address. 
The deputy clerk of the District Court prepared a notice of 
pre-trial indicating that pre-trial was set for April 20, 1978. 
Copies of this document were sent to defendant's attorney, as 
well as the defendant by mailing. In addition to the notice of 
pre-trial sent by the deputy clerk, the plaintiff's attorney mail 
a copy of the notice of pre-trial by certified mail to the 
defendant which was returned "unclaimed". Plaintiff appeared 
for the scheduled pre-trial. Defendant, Mower, did not appear an· 
was not represented by counsel. The Court received into evidence 
by proffer the notice of pre-trial which had been sent by 
certified mail to the defendant and returned "unclaimed" and docu 
ments relating to the substantive allegations of the plaintiff's 
amended complaint and granted a default judgment in favor of 
plaintiff against defendant Mower for fraudulent misrepresentatio 
in the amount of $13,225.63 plus costs and interest. The defenda 
contacted an attorney and timely filed a motion to set aside the 
default judgment on the basis of "excusable neglect" claiming 
that he had never received a notice of pre-trial which was sent 
certified mail and returned "unclaimed" and tha_t he became aware 
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of the pre-trial hearing through a telephone · 
conversation with 
his former wife. Defendant made no specific mention of whether 
he had received the notice of pre-trial mailed by the deputy 
clerk of the District Court approximately one month prior to 
the scheduled pre-trial and that he did not know of the withdraw! 
of his attorney until seven days before the scheduled pre-trial. 
The trial Court denied the motion to set aside the default judgment 
after finding that defendant knew about the pre-trial date, 
that he had received timely notice, and that the withdraw! 
of his attorney had taken place months prior to the date of pre-trial. 
This Court upheld the action of the trial Court and refused to 
set aside the default judgment. The basis of the decision was 
as follows: 
"In the case before us, the defendant did not 
offer the trial Court a reasonable excuse for 
his non-appearance so as to bring him under the 
rule that the Court should liberally excersise 
their power to set aside default judgments. 
Repeated attempts were made by the Court, by 
counsel for the adverse party and by Mower's 
own attorney to contact him regarding t~e 
status of the law suit he knew was pending. 
Despite the fact that Mower's fi:st atto:ney 
certified that he had sent a notice of with-
draw! of counsel to Mower's Washington State 
residence on March 2, Mower claimed he did not. 
learn of the withdraw! until April 12t~. De~pite 
the fact that the District Co~rt Cler~ s office 
sent Mower a notice of pre-trial to his 
Washington State residence on March 8th and 
despite the fact that plainti~f's counse~f. d 
mailed a copy of the same notice by certi ie 
· t es;dence Mower mail to Mower's Washing on r ... , . . 
claimed he didn't learn of the pre-trial hearing 
until March 18th. 
d t's mail-gram nor his 
"Moreover, neither def~nh~n motion to set aside 
affidavit in supper~ 0 i~ offers a full and 
the second default JUdgmen 
-7-
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complete enough explanation for defendant:s 
non-appearance sufficient to mandate a trial 
Court setting aside the judgment.****Mower 
also incorrectly stated in his affidavit that 
this mail-gram indicated to the Court "he had 
received no notice of the hearing and that he 
did not have time to retain another attorney or 
to prepare for the hearing". Aside from these 
vague and sometimes incorrect statements, Mower's 
affidavit does not attempt to explain the reasons 
for his failure to appear at the pre-trial hearing". 
In the instant case, notice to appoint counsel was sent 
directly to Lafe Brown, President of appellant, at the instruction 
of Judge Taylor, and clearly states he was to appoint new 
counsel to represent defendant in that Mr. Haws had withdrawn 
and placed appellant on notice that the case was set for trial 
on May 7, 1979 at 10:00 a.m. Receipt of this notice was 
acknowledged by Mr. Brown in his verified motion to vacate the 
judgment. Mr. Haws sent notice on April 12, 1979 directly to 
Mr. Brown at the offices of Agla Development of his withdrawal, 
which notice also contained notice of the trial date. The Clerk 
of the Court routinely called each of the parties the day before 
trial to inform them of the Judge to which the case had been 
assigned. Mr. Brown, having fired his attorney Mr. Haws, could 
not deny that he had notice of the withdrawl of his counsel. The 
Court was not obliged to believe the somewhat questionable 
excuse given by Mr. Brown in the verified motion to vacate the 
default judgment, that the notice to appoint counsel was misplaced 
and that he had no notice of the trial date until May 14, 1979. 
{R.35-36) In view of these facts, the trial Courts conclusion 
that Mr. Brown's failure to heed the notices received was his 
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"deliberate choice" does not seem unreasonable. The conclusion 
to the contrary is unreasonable and therefore does not constitute 
excusable neglect. The instant case has a much stronger basis 
for denial of the motion to vacate the default judgment under a 
claim that notice to appoint counsel was not received or was 
misplaced since, unlike the Mower case, the defendant had fired 
its attorney, and was clearly placed on notice of the trial 
setting and of its obligation to appoint counsel. That the 
failure of the defendant to respond was due to carelessness and 
negligence on the part of defendant's President, Mr. Brown. 
"Carelessness" is not synonymous with "excusable neglect" 
on the basis of which a default judgment may be set aside. 
Beyerle Sand and Gravel, Inc. v. Martinez (Arz. 1977) 574 P.2d 
853. In this case the Arizona Court determined the fact that the 
Vice-President of the Corporation had been careless in failing 
to retain an attorney to file an answer in an action for breech 
of lease was not "excusable neglect" on the basis of which a 
default judgment could be set aside. Excusable neglect with 
respect to failure to appear for trial involves a situation where 
failure to act resulted from circumstances which would cause a 
reasonably careful person to neglect his duties, but failure to act 
do to carelessness and negligence is not "excusable neglect" 
~a that would entitle one to have a judgment against him set aside. 
Watered Down Farms v. Rowe (Colo. 1977) 566 P.2d 710. 
If illness is not excusable neglect, Warren v. Dixon Ranch co. 
123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953), certainly carelessness in 
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failing to appoint new counsel and appear at trial where due 
notice has been given does not constitute excusable neglect. 
Moreover, it has been specifically held that a party trying 
to set aside a default judgment "must show that he has used 
due deligence, and he was prevented from appearing by circumstance 
over which he had no control." (Emphasis added) AirKem Intermoun 
tain Inc., v. Parker, 513 P.2d 429, (1973). Where notice of 
trial had been communicated to the adverse party in sufficient 
time to enable appearance and to defend the action, there is 
no claim for excusable neglect. 
The question is one presented to the discretion of the 
trial Judge, and will be set aside only if there is a clear abuse 
discretion. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., (Supra); Board of Educatio 
of Granite School District v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d 385, 384 P.2d 806 
(1963); AirKem Intermountain Inc., v. Parker (supra 1973). The 
facts before the Court give no basis for a finding that the trial 
Court abused its discretion in these circumstances. It is 
apparent that the trial Court did not believe the statements 
of Lafe Brown as contained in the verified motion to vacate the 
default judgment and found that the failure to appoint new 
counsel and to appear at trial after adequate notice was given 
was carelessness and negligence on appellant's part. (T. 4, line 19 
to T.5 line 25) Generally, this Court will not substitue its 
discretion for that of the trial Court. The rule that courts 
will incline towards granting relief to a party requesting relief 
from a final judgment to one who has not had opportunity to 
present his case, is ordinarily applied at the trial court level, 
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and the Supreme Court will not reverse the determination of 
the trial Court merely because the motion to vacate the 
judgment could have been granted. AirKem Intermountain Inc. 
v. Parker (Supra 1973); Warren v. Dixon Ranch co. (Supra 1953). 
Only where there is a clear abuse of this discretion will the 
trial Court be reversed and each case must be determined on 
its own facts and circumstances as they appear at the trial 
Court level. Heath v. Mower (Supra 1979). 
Respondent has never taken issue with the timeliness 
of appellant's motion to vacate the default judgment. The 
argument of appellant on page 7 of its brief that it provided 
reasonable grounds for the failure to be present at trial 
as constituting "excusable neglect", is not supported by the 
facts. The claim of appellant that notice was never received 
of the trial date prior to the trial is clearly contradicted 
by the verified affidavit of Mr. Brown, President of appellant, 
and the record that was before the trial Court. 
The appellant, raises on appeal for the first time, 
pursuant to motion to supplement the record, additional 
statements by affidavit of Lafe Brown, appellant's President· 
Statements which were not before the trial Court and are based 
primarily upon information and belief. Matters that are stated 
upon information and belief are not proper matters for affidavits. 
Where the statements contained therein are raised for the first 
time on appeal, this court should decline to decide the issue 
before the Court on such statements. Nelson v. Newman, Utah, 583 
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P.2d 601 (1978). 
CONCLUSION 
The issue before the Court is whether the circumstances 
surrounding the defendants failure to appoint new counsel and 
appear at the scheduled trial constitute excusable neglect. 
The record before the trial Court clearly sets forth facts 
that appellant was given adequate notice of the trial setting, 
both by its attorney, Mr. Haws pursuant to the notice of withdrawa 
of counsel and the notice sent by respondents counsel to appoint 
new counsel. Further, the Clerk of the Court notified the 
parties the day before trial as to the Judge to which the case 
was assigned for trial. That the notice to appoint counsel and 
of the trial setting was in fact received by appellants President, 
Mr. Brown, but was put aside, ignored and then claimed to have 
been misplaced. These facts demonstrate that the trial Court 
did not abuse its discretion in finding there was no excusable 
neglect justifying the setting aside of the default judgment. 
DATED this ~day of November, 1979. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
~~~ ~~er 
Attorney for Respondent 
Suite 430 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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